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COMMENT
Title VII: How To Break The Law Without Really

Trying

The success of the labor movement in the United States is largely due to federal
legislation.' In 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act which
precluded the employer from using his most successful weapon-the labor
injunction. 2 In 1935 Congress passed the Wagner Act which guaranteed to
working men the right to organize and join labor unions and protected this
right from various forms of employer interference.' The Wagner Act gave such
a tremendous impetus to the labor movement that in 1949 Congress passed
the Taft-Hartley Act.' This Act imposed various obligations on labor unions
to ensure that their economic strength was not deleteriously employed.
Subsequently, in 1959, Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act which
imposed a number of fiduciary obligations on labor unions and provided union
members with the right to select their own leaders.' At first glance it would
appear that this comprehensive and complicated legislative scheme was
sufficient to protect all workers and provide them with the means for "securing
for themselves the blessings of life, liberty and happiness." This, however, was
not the case, for the Industrial Revolution did not include America's blacks.
The civil rights movement of the late 1950's exerted great pressure on
Congress to enact legislation which would secure fundamental personal rights
to minority Americans. Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act
of 1957.6 The reports of the Commission on Civil Rights, established pursuant
to the Act of 1957, were instrumental in having Congress pass the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.1 Title VII of the Act of.1964 imposes a myriad of obligations
on employers and other organizations and outlines various procedures to be
followed by an aggrieved party in seeking redress of his Title VII rights. This
article will examine these procedural requirements and also the rules established
by the various courts in determining the legality of certain business practices.
This examination will involve a discussion of the more important cases that
have interpreted Title VII. While the number of cases analyzed is limited,
I.

For an excellent discussion of labor's early problems see J. COMMONS and E. GILMORE, A
(19th ed. 1910).
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1964).
29 U.S.C. § 153 et seq. (1964).
71 Stat. 634 (1957) (codified in various sections of 5, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964. [Hereinafter cited as Title VII].
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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nevertheless, the rationale and tests evolved by these cases are applicable to
all the proscriptions of Title VII. The purpose of this article is to present
employers with a series of viable tests and guidelines by which they will be
able to judge the legality of their business practices. Before beginning this
analysis and examining these tests, it is necessary that the various provisions
of Title VI I be examined and understood.
Title VII
Title VII proclaims that it is the right of every employee' to seek and obtain
employment with any employer.' In order to effectuate this purpose Title VII
delineates three specific categories of "persons,"' 0 employers, employment
agencies, and labor unions. It provides that any discrimination practiced by
them in connection with an employee's race, religion, color, sex, or national
origin is an unlawful employment practice." An employer is defined as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year."' 2 The term "employment agency" as
used within Title VII is interpreted as applying "to any person [who] regularly undertake[s] with or without compensation to procure employees for an
employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer. '"'
Employment agencies are precluded from classifying or refusing to refer an
employee for employment because of his race, religion, color, sex or national
origin." A labor organization is defined as one which is engaged in an industry
affecting commerce and which exists for the purpose of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes or other terms or conditions of employment. 15 Labor organizations are forbidden to discriminate against any em8. The term "employee" as used herein also includes prospective employees unless the contrary
is explicitly stated.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). It took Congress over 20 years to enact a fair employment
practices bill. Representative Vito Marcantonio introduced the bill in Congress in March of 1941.
This unsuccessful attempt was followed by hundreds of others until finally Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, which was the forebear of Title VII.
10. Title VII defines the term "person" as follows:
The term "person" includes one or more individuals labor unions, partnerships,
associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or
receivers.
42 U.S.C. 2000e (1964).
II. The word "discrimination" is not defined in Title VII. For some suggested types of
discrimination that are forbidden by Title VI I, see Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private
or Public Law, 15 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1969).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
13. Id.
14. Id.at § 2(b).

15. Id. at § 2(d), (e).
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ployee because of his race, religion, color, sex or national origin by (I) excluding or expelling him from membership; (2) limiting, segregating or classifying
its membership and refusing to refer him for employment; and (3) causing an
employer to discriminate against him in violation of the Act.'"
Congress recognized, however, that certain enterprises could not adequately
function if they were forced to hire employees who did not possess certain
qualifications, such as sex, religion or national origin. Accordingly, Congress
provided that an employer may discriminate against employees without
committing an unlawful employment practice in three situations: (I) where sex,
religion or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification; 7 (2) where
the employee is a member of the Communist party; 9 (3) where a position is
subject to the requirements imposed in the interests of national security and
the employee fails to meet these criteria. 9 Furthermore, Congress restrictively
defined the term "employer" so that it effectively includes only eight percent
of the nation's employers.2 This restrictive definition denies the protection of
Title VII to 44 million of the nation's employees.2 ' The term "employer" was
further restricted by Congress in that it specifically exempted the United States,
a state or political subdivision thereof, or a bona fide private membership club
from the Act's coverage.2
Section 705 of Title VII establishes the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission [EEOC] and enumerates its powers.2 Essentially the EEOC's
authority in enforcing the Act is limited to the power of persuasion, i.e., it
24
attempts to achieve voluntary compliance with the Act through conciliation.
Although the EEOC's enforcement powers are limited, its investigatory powers
are far reaching. Section 710(a) grants the EEOC the authority "to examine
witnesses under oath and to require the production of documentary evidence
relevant or material to the charge under investigation." The EEOC can have
its subpoenas enforced against any recalcitrant party by petitioning the United
States district court in which the person is found or is transacting business
26
and requesting the court to order the party's compliance.
16. Id. at § 2(c).
17. Id. at § 2(e).
18. Id. at § 2(l). The constitutionality. of this provision is doubtful in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
19. Id. at § 2(g).
20. 110 CONG. REC. 13090 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
23. Id. at § 4(f).
24. Id.
25. Id.at § 9(a).

26. Id. at §9(b).
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The EEOC becomes involved in discrimination cases when an aggrieved party
or a member of the EEOC files a charge pursuant to Section 706(a).Y Section
706(b) provides that when an alleged unlawful employment practice is
committed within a state or political subdivision thereof, and that state or
subdivision has a law prohibiting such a practice, then the aggrieved party must
first file hiscomplaint in the state. After the state has held and terminated its
proceedings, or after the expiration of sixty days, whichever occurs first, the
aggrieved party may then file his charge with the EEOC: Subsection (e) of
Section 706 permits an aggrieved party to bring a civil suit when the EEOC's
conciliation attempts have failed and also allows the court to permit the
Attorney General to intervene as a matter of right in a private case if he certifies
that the case is of general public importance.
Section 706(f) of the Act grants jurisdiction to the federal courts to adjudicte
"cases and controversies" arising under Title VII, and provides the proper
28
venue for these cases.
Once a private suit has been commenced the EEOC may intervene as an
amicus curiae. This action has no statutory basis but the courts have adopted
the attitude that the EEOC would be helpful in reaching a decision and framing
the appropriate relief.29 In addition to appearing as an amicus, the EEOC
recently has successfully intervened in a private suit under the criteria
established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30 Although permissive
intervention by the EEOC is not an adequate substitute for stricter enforcement
powers, nevertheless, it does provide a statutory framework whereby the EEOC
can more easily determine its own destiny.
Enforcement of the substantive rights of employees therefore, can be obtained
by: (1) the EEOC's conciliation efforts; (2) a private civil suit; or (3) a civil
suit instituted by the Attorney General.
The Attorney General is empowered by the language of Section 707(a) to
bring a civil action whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination
27.
28.

Id. at § 5(a).
Id. at § 5(0. Section 706(") states that the venue for Title VII cases shall be:
[1] In judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged
to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records
relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district
in which the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment
practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may
be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.
29. Virgil v. American Tel. &Tel. Co., 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 99 9321 (D. Colo. 1969).
30. Childress v. Plumbers Local 27, Civil No. 69-1428 (W.D. Pa., filed Dec. 23, 1969). EEOC
intervened under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
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in violation of Title VII. After the EEOC's conciliation efforts have failed and
a civil suit is filed, the federal courts are empowered to "enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or
hiring of employees, with or without back pay."'"
Traditionally the only pecuniary relief that the courts have awarded to
discriminatees has been back pay. In "pattern and practice" cases the Attorney
General has generally not sought back pay for the allegedly aggrieved parties.
The Justice Department is apparently of the opinion that "pattern and
practice" cases serve only a precedent making function and that back pay is
therefore inappropriate. 2 This rationale does not apply to private civil cases
for the raison d'etre of the Section 706 suit is the complete vindication of the
plaintiff's Title VI I rights. Several commentators have suggested, however, that
discriminatees be awarded a type of general compensatory damage.3 Such a
remedy it is suggested, is clearly within the scope of the court's power to order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate. The appropriateness of a
compensatory damage remedy, while having a certain emotional appeal, is
replete with legal difficulties. First, the legislative history does not support it. 31
Second, the injury which the award would seek to correct, i.e., psychological
injury, would probably be too remote. Third, recovery for psychological
injuries would run counter to the National Labor Relations Board practice on
which the remedial provisions of Title VI I were modeled. 3 Any compensatory
damage remedy, therefore, whether founded on contract or tort theory, has
not and should not be allowed in "pattern and practice" cases or in private
suits.
ProceduralIssues
ProperParties
Title VII litigation has been inundated with procedural problems because of
the various requirements established in Section 706 of the Act. These problems
arise when the EE:OC's conciliation efforts have failed to eradicate the alleged
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
32. Note, Developments-Title VII, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1243 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment Under The Civil Rights Act of
1964, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 430, 467 (1965); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination
Under Title VIi, 54 VA. L. REV. 491 (1968).
34. See 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., IstSess. 112 (1963).
35. See A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1007 (1964); W. PNoSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 50 (3ed.
1964). See also St. Clair v. Teamsters Local 515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
36. See note 34 supra.
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discriminatory practices and the aggrieved party institutes a civil suit. Prior
to 1970 it was generally held by the courts that the only proper defendants in
a Section 706 civil action were those who had been previously named as
respondents in the charges filed with the EEOC.37 In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co. 3 1 the court stated that:
It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a suit under Title
VII that a charge be filed with the EEOC against the party to be
sued. This provision serves two important purposes. First, it notifies
the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the
charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the
Act's primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the
39
law.
Using this approach the court held that the party not named in the EEOC
charge could not be held liable for damages and accordingly should be
dismissed from the case. Subsequent cases upheld this rationale and further
stated that Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was inapplicable to Section
706 cases. 4 " The court in Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.41 went to
great lengths to distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Jones v. Alfred
H. Meyer Co. 42 from Section 706 cases. The Smith court reasoned that in Jones
the Supreme Court was interpreting Section 2 of the Act of 1866 and the
plaintiff in Smith was seeking a determination of his case under Section 1.
The Smith court also observed that in previous cases the Supreme Court had
ample opportunity to apply Section I but had declined to do so.' 3 The court
also pointed out that Title VII would be redundant and unnecessary if Section
I made private discrimination unlawful. The Smith court, therefore, concluded
that (I) the statutory structure evidenced a congressional preference for
administrative investigation and conciliation to a Section 706 civil suit and,
37. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co.,
I FEPCas. 719 (N.C. Ga. 1969); Sokolowski v. Swift Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn. 1968).
38. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
39. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Act of 1866]. Section 1981 states: All persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other. Section 1982 states: All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
41. 50 F.R.D. 505 (S.D. Okla. 1970). See also Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 301 F. Supp.
663 (N.D. III. 1969).
42. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
43. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Airlines, Co., 372 U.S. 714 (1963);
Steel v. Louisville &Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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(2) that Section 1 applied only to actions under the "color of state law.",
This rationale has recently been overturned.
In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,4 5 the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower
court and held that in certain circumstances an aggrieved party could maintain
a Section 706 suit under Section I of the Act of 1866. The court reasoned
that Section 1 forbade racial discrimination in the making and enforcing of
contracts and concluded that it was applicable to both unions and employers
since the relationship between the employee, the union and the employer is
essentially one of contract. The court rejected all of the defendant's arguments
and stated:"
Because of the strong emphasis which Congress placed upon
conciliation, we do not think that aggrieved persons should be
allowed intentionally to bypass the Commission without good
reason. We hold, therefore, that an aggrieved person may sue
directly under section 1981 if he pleads a reasonable excuse for his
failure to exhaust EEOC remedies. 7
The Waters court recognized that Congress was probably unaware of the
existence of Section 1 when it enacted Title VII. It is for this reason that the
court's holding is limited. However, the Third Circuit in the case of Young
v. InternationalTelephone & Telegraph Co. 48 was not as restrictive in interpreting Section 1. In Young the court said:
Conciliation features of Title VII, implemented by EEOC, should
not be entirely disregarded in the course of that suit under Section
1981. There is ample scope, within the traditional bounds of
discretion in the application of equitable remedies, for the district
courts to develop on a case by case basis an accomodation between
their jurisdiction under Section 1981 and the conciliation efforts of
44. Accord, Colbert v. H.-K. Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Norman v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., I FEP Cas. 331 (E. D. Ark. 1968); Lucom v. Atd. Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1965), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 984 (1966).
45. 301 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
911 (1970).
46. The defendants argued (I) that a cause of action could not be maintained under Section
I of the Act of 1866 because this would virtually destroy the provisions of Title VII; (2) that Title
VII was intended by Congress to be a comprehensive scheme to eliminate racial discrimination
in employment and that therefore the provisions of Section I of the Act of 1866, if applicable,
were impliedly repealed; (3) that property rights have traditionally been subject to greater
governmental regulation than oter private activity.
47. 427 F.2d at 487. For additional cases holding that a party need not be named in an EEOC
charge to be a proper defendant in a Section 706 civil suit, see McDonald v. Musicians, 308 F.
Supp. 664 (N.D. II1. 1970); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., I FEP Cas. 782 (S.D. Tex. 1969);
Bremer v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 310 F. Supp. 1333, (E.D. Mo. 1969); State v. Baugh
Const. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 598, (W.D. Wash. 1969).
48. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 197 1).
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the commission. . . . By fashioning equitable relief with regard to
the availability of conciliation and by encouraging in appropriate
cases a resort to the EEOC during the pendency of Section 1981
cases the courts will carry out the policies of both statutes."9
The Third Circuit viewed Title VII as being a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, Section 1. It apparently rejected the Seventh Circuit's opinion
with respect to congressional unawareness of Section l's existence. Thus
construed, the Young decision provides an aggrieved party with two options,
i.e., (I) file an unlawful employment practice charge with the EEOC, or (2)
sue his employer directly under Section 1.
The Seventh Circuit's approach would appear to be the more reasonable for
the language of Title VII and its legislative history support it. The national
policy against employment discrimination is better effectuated by having the
EEOC promulgate certain specific guidelines and seek employer compliance
with them than by having the federal courts decide on a case by case basis
how to best rid the nation of employment discrimination. The applicability of
Section I has not arisen in any cases of discrimination based on sex or religion,
and arguments could be made that it does not apply since Section I speaks
only to racial discrimination.
Statute of Limitations
Section 706(d) of Title VII establishes various time restrictions within which
an aggrieved party must file a charge with the EEOC. 50 The courts have held
that these requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites to a subsequent civil
suit. 5 However, several important exceptions to the filing requirements have
been recognized. The Seventh Circuit in Cox v. United States Gypsum Co.5"
held that aggrieved parties had timely filed their charges with the EEOC where
the unlawful employment practice was of a continuing nature. The court stated
49. Id. at 764.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964) provides:
A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed within ninety days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, except that in the case of an unlawful
employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has followed the
procedure set out in subsection (b), of this section, such charge shall be filed by the
person aggrieved within two hundred and ten days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State . . . has
terminated [its] procedings.
Subsection (b) of Section 706 referred to above requires that if a state in which the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred has a statute prohibiting discriminatory employment practices, the
aggrieved party must first file a charge with the state.
51. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Fore v. Southern
Bell Tel. Co., 293 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. N.C. 1968).
52. 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
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various reasons for its conclusion the most important of which were (1)the
EEOC had considered the charges as being timely filed and, (2) the employer
had bound himself by his collective bargaining agreement to consider an
employee's seniority when recalling laid off workers. The court emphasized the
fact that the employer had breached his collective bargaining contract by
recalling employees with less seniority than the aggrieved parties. Therefore,
he
every time the employer recalled an employee who had less seniority,
53
I.
VI
Title
violated
and
breached the collective bargaining agreement
The Fifth Circuit has created another important exception to the jurisdictional criteria established in Section 706(d). In Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 5 1 the court held that the applicable statutory period was tolled while the
plaintiff was pursuing his remedies under a collective bargaining agreement.
The court cited two of its prior decisions 55 and emphasized that "the central
theme of Title VII is private settlement [of alleged unlawful employment
practices] as an effective end to employment discrimination."" The court
further stated:
It would, therefore, be an improper reading of the purpose of Title
VII if we were to construe the statute as did the district court to
permit the short statute of limitations to penalize a common
employee, who at no time resting on his rights attempts first in good
faith to reach private settlement without litigation in the elimination
of what he believes to be an unfair, as well as an unlawful practice.57
A major practical problem is created by the EEOC's inability to attempt
conciliation within the prescribed statutory period-its investigative backlog
is one and one-half years. 58 Some Section 706 case defendants have attempted
to take advantage of this situation by asserting that an aggrieved party must
commence his action within 90 days after he files his charge with the EEOC
or be barred from maintaining it.59 This limitation is derived by adding the
60 day period which Title VII allots for the EEOC's conciliation efforts to
the 30 day period within which an aggrieved party is rquired to file his action
after he receives notification from the EEOC that its compliance efforts have
53.

See also Sciaiuffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F.Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970); Austin v. Reynolds

Metals Co., 2 FEP Cas. 451 (E.D. Va. 1970). However, continuing violations have been expressly
rejected by other courts; Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195 (W.D.
Va. 1969); Hutchings v. United States Indus. 309 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
54. 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
55. Otis v. Crown Zellerback, 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
56. 421 F.2d 889.
57. Id. at 890. -,
58. Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1969).
59. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., I FEP Cas. 252 (D. Calif. 1967).
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failed. The courts, however, have uniformly rejected this argument.60 The
leading case in this area is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cunningham v. Litton
Industries," in which the court said:
The 30 to 60 day period prescribed in the statute in which the EEOC
is to act should be interpreted as directory and not mandatory in
nature. Commission action and issuance of notice within 60 days
is not a condition precedent to an aggrieved person's right to sue
in federal district court ...
We hold that the 30 day period within which suit may be filed in
Federal district court begins to run when the aggrieved party receives
notice of failure to effect voluntary compliance from the EEOC,
regardless of the period of time the Commission has taken to process
the charge.6"
Similarly, where the EEOC has not acted on a complaint, the courts are in
agreement that a plaintiff may preserve his action without awaiting a "cause"
or "no cause" finding or a conciliation attempt by the EEOC as long as it
has sent the plaintiff a "suit letter.163 The results in these cases appear to be
in accord with congressional intent and substantially resolve the major practical
problem encountered in the private enforcement of Title VII. If the statutory
language were strictly construed, private enforcement of Title VII would be
nonexistent. The jurisdictional prerequisites to a Section 706 civil suit are,
therefore, (1)the failure of the EEOC to effect voluntary compliance with the
proscriptions of Title VII through conciliation and subsequent notification to
the plaintiff of its failure, and (2) the aggrieved party's filing his complaint
within 30 days after receiving notification of the EEOC's failure to achieve
voluntary compliance.6"
Reasonable Cause Finding by the EEOC
Another procedural issue that is currently receiving considerable attention is
whether an aggrieved party can maintain a Section 706 civil suit when the
EEOC has determined that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful employment practice has been committed. Previous court cases have
60. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1969); Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
61. 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
62. Id. at 890.
63. Carr v. Conoco Plastics Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970); Noon v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
2 FEP Cas. 65 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., I FEP Cas. 782 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
Contra Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps I FEPCas. 894 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
64. Martineg v. Nat. Linen Service, 2 FEP Cas. 300 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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held that the EEOC must notify the aggrieved party that its voluntary conciliation efforts have failed. These cases have held that the finding of reasonable
cause would of necessity be part of the jurisdictional element of notice that the
EEOC had been unable to effect reconciliation. Therefore, they concluded that
the EEOC could not logically notify the aggrieved party of its failure at reconciliation since it was never attempted. 5 In Green v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp.," the district court examined the legislative history of Title VII and
concluded that it was the intent of Congress that the EEOC first determine
reasonable cause existed to conclude that an unlawful employment practice had
occurred. The court examined the original House bill which provided that an
aggrieved party could bring suit if he obtained the permission of a member
of the EEOC even if the charge was rejected as having no merit. The court
concluded that the deletion of this provision by the Senate was significant. 7
A better reasoned opinion however, is that of the Third Circuit in Fekete v.
United States Steel Corp.6 8 The Fekete court also examined the legislative
history of Title VII but concluded that judicial review of administrative
procedings was more desirable than administrative absolutism. The Third
Circuit relied heavily upon the case of Grimm v. Westinghouse Electric Corp."
In Grimm the court stated:
Only by permitting plaintiff to bring a private suit despite a
Commission finding of no reasonable cause can this court give effect
to the established principle that a grievant may not be prejudiced
by any conduct of the Commission. [Citations omitted.] Only by
permitting plaintiff to bring suit can this court preserve the statutory
scheme whereby the right to equal employment opportunity is to
be secured by individuals.70
The Fekete decision subjects the employer to the possibility of litigation after
the EEOC has failed to find him guilty of an unlawful employment practice.
While the decision is in accordance with the principles of judicial review of
the administrative process, its practical effect on employers is negligible. Few
plaintiffs will be tempted to sue their employers when the EEOC, which resolves
all doubts in favor of the employee, has concluded that the employer has not
violated the proscriptions of Title VII.

65.
2 FEP
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Chavez v. Rust Tractor Co., 2 FEP Cas. 339 (D. N.M. 1969); Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers,
Cas. 233 (N.D. III. 1969).
299 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
The only debate touching this problem is found at 110 CONG. REC. 14186-92 (1964).
424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
Id. at 990.
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Effect of A rbitration
The courts have generally held that the aggrieved party is not required as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the grievance and arbitration procedures
of a collective bargaining agreement before pursuing his Title VII remedies. 7
The rationale for this decision was explained in the case of Evans v. Local
2127, IBEW.12 The Evans court concluded that the aggrieved party was seeking
redress of a statutory right and not a right which accrued to him under a
collective bargaining agreement. The court reasoned, therefore, that the
Supreme Court's decision in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,73 which required
an aggrieved party to exhaust his contractual remedies, was inapplicable.
Similarly, the courts have uniformly rejected the idea that an aggrieved party
must elect which of his remedies to pursue, i.e., the arbitration procedure of
the collective bargaining agreement or a Section 706 civil suit. 7' The only real
limitation imposed on an aggrieved party by the courts in filing a Section 706
civil suit is the possibility of double recovery. An aggrieved party is precluded
from maintaining a private suit if the possibility exists that he would be unjustly
enriched."5
A more difficult problem is presented, however, when an aggrieved party
has carried his grievance through the arbitration process to a final determination. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that the arbitrator's award
is not final and binding on the aggrieved party and that he may sue privately,76
while the Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion." The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits agree that "determinations under a contract grievancearbitration process will involve rights and remedies separate and distinct
from those involved in judicial proceedings under Title VIl. ' '7 The Sixth
Circuit maintains that relitigation of the dispute would work to undermine the
national policy favoring arbitration. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 7 the
court said:
This result would sound the death knell to arbitration of labor
71. Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1969). See also
1968 Dux L.J. 1000, 1004-05 n. 33.
72. 313 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
73. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
74. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 300 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
75. Id.
76. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
77. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), petition for rehearing denied, 429 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.), aff'd 39 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. June I, 1971).
78. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970).
79. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).
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disputes, which has been so usefully employed in their settlement.
Employers would not be inclined to agree to arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements if they provide only a one way
street, i.e., that the awards are binding on them but not on their
employees.8
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Dewey and affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's decision by an equally divided Court." There were no opinions
issued and the case has no precedent value but it is obvious from the four-tofour decision that the positions of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits and the Sixth
Circuit have merit.
While the issue of multiple forums and multiple remedies remains, the
problem is not insoluble. The National Labor Relations Board resolved this
identical issue in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.82 by deciding that it would refuse
to exercise its jurisdiction to set aside an arbitration award issued pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement even though the alleged grievance was
arguably an unfair labor practice. The criteria established by the National
Labor Relations Board in Spielberg were that the arbitration process had to
be "fair and regular, all parties hav[ing] agreed to be bound, and the decision
of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act. " ' A Spielberg type doctrine could be adopted by the EEOC.4
However, because the EEOC has neither enforcement powers nor the power
to prevent an aggrieved party from filing a private suit, the federal courts must
be convinced that this type of procedure will effectuate the purposes of Title
VII and reduce the caseload of both the EEOC and the courts.
Scope of Class Actions
The last significant, and perhaps the most difficult, procedural problem
presented to the courts has been the permissible scope of the class action. The
courts have weighed various and conflicting considerations, the most important
of which have been the desirability of avoiding separate litigation through the
use of broad class actions and the recognition that individual discrimination
may require plant wide solutions versus the concern that broad class actions
may extend the scope of the individual's charge before the EEOC and thus
effectively bypass its procedures. The various cases discussing this issue have
resolved the problem in favor of allowing class actions but limiting the members
80. Id. at 332.
81. Supra note 77.
82. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
83. Id. at 1082.
84. Cf Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA.
L. REv.401 (1969).
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of the class. The leading case in this area is Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp.85 where the Fifth Circuit laid down two requirements for the maintenance
of a class action: (I) the action must meet the requirements of Rules 23(a)
and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the issues raised before
the court must have been raised before the EEOC.86 Class actions have also
been upheld in cases where all the members of the class were in the same status,
87
i.e., all dischargees or all employees or all seeking the same type of relief.
However, some courts have refused to limit the members of the class according
to their employment status.88 These courts reason that this classification is
unnecessary since the court can realign the parties in accordance with their
real interests, 9 or grant different types of relief to the members of the class
depending on their status. 9"
Substantive Issues
Seniority Systems
The overt discrimination practiced by many of the employers covered by Title
VII ceased on July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Act.8" However, certain
industrial institutions and programs retained the vestiges of past discrimination.
Congress, in delegating to the EEOC the initial responsibility for ensuring
compliance with Title VII, provided it with authority to use "informal methods
of conference, conciliation and persuasions." Congress granted the real power
to enforce the substantive provisions of Title VII to the federal courts who
are authorized to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate."
Before analyzing the various cases in which the courts have interpreted and
applied this power, the interpretive memorandum of Senators Clark and Case
should be considered. That memorandum states:
85. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1963).
86. Id. at 499.
87. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Colbert v. H.-K. Corp., 295
F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
88. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Carr v. Conoco
Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969); Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co., 302 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Local 186,
Pulp Workers v. Minnisota Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
90. Austin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 2 FEP Cas. 451 (E. D. Va. 1970); Hayes v. Seaboard Coast
Line RR, 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C.
1968).
91. For employers and unions having 100 or more employees or members Title VI l's protection
became applicable on July 2, 1965, During each of the three succeeding years coverage was extended
to employers and unions having 75, 50, or 25 employees or members respectively, until all employers
and unions with at least 25 employees or members were covered on July 2, 1968. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 701 (b) and (c), 716(a) (1964).
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First, it has been asserted that Title VII would undermine vested
rights of seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no more
effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect. If, for
example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event
of layoffs, those who were hired last must be fired first, such a
provision would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would
be true even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the
effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than
Negroes . . . Title VII . . . is prospective and not retrospective.
Thus, for example, if a business has been discriminating in the past
and as a result has an all white working force when the Title comes
into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or
indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to
prefer Negroes, for future vacancies or, once Negroes are hired, to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white
workers hired earlier.9"
The most troubling issue confronting the courts under Title VII is whether
seniority systems and testing procedures, though non-discriminatory on their
face, violate Title VII by perpetuating the effects of past discrimination.
Although the language of the interpretative memorandum of Senators Clark
and Case would appear to negate the illegality of pre-Act discrimination, the
courts have, in some instances arrived at contrary results.
Seniority, one of the most important concepts in labor relations, may take
various forms in an industrial plant. 3 It may be based on time spent anywhere
in the plant, i.e., plant seniority, or in a particular department, i.e.,
departmental seniority or in a "line of progression." Notwithstanding its
importance, however, the employee's right to seniority is contractual in nature
and, therefore, not absolutely vested. 9 An employee's seniority rights may
be modified considerably by the execution of a new collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the union. This modification is valid if
the union has not breached its duty of fair representation." Title VII recognizes
the utility of seniority systems and permits employers to apply different
standards to their employees if the criteria are based on a "bona fide" seniority
system. Title VII provides that a seniority system is "bona fide" if the disparity
of treatment that it accords to employees is not the result of an intention to
92.
93.

110 CONG. REC. 7207-15 (1964) (remarks of Senators Clark and Case).
SLICHTER,

MANAGEMENT

HEALY AND

LIVERMASH,

THE

IMPACT

OF COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING

ON

104-41 (1960).

94. Affeldt and Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights-Professions, Occupations and
Labor Law, 12 ST. Louis U.L. J. 179, 228 (1967).
95. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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discriminate. 6 Thus, when an aggrieved party alleges that a seniority system
is discriminatory, the courts are required to determine whether or not the system
is "bona fide." There are two requirements that a seniority system must meet
in order to satisfy the criteria of Title VII. First, it must serve a valid business
purpose and, second, it must not be the result of an intention to discriminate.
An examination and analysis of how the courts have interpreted the term "bona
fide" and what "appropriate orders" they have issued when a system was
determined not to be "bona fide" is, therefore, appropriate.
The first Title VII case to challenge the legality of a promotion system, which
was based on departmental seniority, was Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. 7 The
specific issue presented to the court in Quarles was "whether the restrictive
departmental transfer and seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement are intentional, unlawful employment practices because they are
superimposed on a departmental structure that was organized on a racially
segregated basis." 98 In resolving this issue the court considered various factors,
the most significant of which was the effect of the interdepartmental transfer
system on the employees and on the operation of the defendant's business.
The defendant's business was composed of four different departments and
the job classifications in each department were ranked in a definite order for
purposes of determining progression. The higher ranked jobs were filled by
advancing employees based on their departmental seniority, merit and ability.
An advanced employee was provided with a 90 day probationary period in
which to demonstrate his qualifications. If the employee failed to attain the
requisite expertise, he was returned to his previous position. The court evaluated
this system, considered its ramifications and concluded that:
Operation of the company's business on departmental lines with restrictive departmental transfers serves many legitimate management functions. It promotes efficiency, encourages junior employees
to remain with the company because of the prospects of advancement, and limits the amount of retraining that would be necessary
without departmental organization."9
Notwithstanding these valid "business purposes" the court held that the
departmental seniority provisions when applied to the transfer and advancement
opportunities of Negroes were unduly restrictive.'" The Quarles court, in
96.
97.
98.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Id. at 512.

99. Id.at 518.
100. The Negro who desired a transfer from his present position to one more lucrative had
two options. First, he could wait until he had accumulated a sufficient amount of employment
seniority to avail himself of the company's transfer system. The transfer provision allowed six
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arriving at its decision, considered the case of Whitfield v. United Steelworkers
of America' and, while concurring in its result, distinguished it on the grounds
of substantial employer interest. In Whitfield an interdepartmental transfer
system based on departmental seniority was upheld because the court found
that: (I) there was no inter-relation of skills between the employees of the
different departments, and (2) promotion within a department depended on the
skills one had previously learned in his prior position. The court in Quarles
concluded that these special circumstances were not present in the case before
it.
The Quarles court apparently reasoned that the employer would not suffer
any substantial injury if an employee seeking advancement did not possess,
at the time of his application, the qualifications necessary for the job. The court
concluded that since every advanced employee was allowed a ninety day
probationary period in which to develop and/or achieve the necessary level of
competence, the only deleterious effect on the employer was a slightly more
costly and time consuming advancement process. In essence, therefore, the
court weighed the business interests of the employer against the discriminatory
effects produced by the seniority system and concluded that the system must
fall. The "appropriate order" issued by the court provided that all qualified
Negroes would be allowed to transfer into other departments and that their
departmental seniority would be the same as their employment seniority. The
Quarles test, the comparing of the employer's business purpose with the
discriminatory effect produced on the horizontal and vertical mobility of
minority workers has been accepted and applied by other courts. 02
The Quarles test was applied by the court in the case of United States v.
H.K. Porter Co., 0 3 but it resulted in a different determination-it refused to
abolish a departmental seniority system. In arriving at this conclusion the court
relied heavily on three factors: (I) the possibility of upward mobility of Negroes
was present-indeed many had advanced into positions previously held by
employees to transfer every six months. Second, he could apply to management for a transfer
but if he received it all of his previous departmental seniority would be lost. This loss of
departmental seniority would subject the transferee to being laid off first in the event of an economic
slowdown. However, if the transferee were threatened with layoff, he could return to his previous
department. Notwithstanding all of these provisions, the transferee was still required to satisfy
the ability and merit requirements of his new position.
101. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959). In Whitfield the plaintiffs
brought suit under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), alleging that
the union had breached its duty of fair representation.
102. See, e.g., Robinson v. P. Lorillard Co., 2 FEP Cas. 465 (M.D. N.C. 1970); Irvin v.
Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Ark. 1970); United States v. Bethelehem Steel Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1970); United States v. Continental Can Co., 319 F. Supp. 161
(E.D. Va. 1970).
103. 296 F. Supp. 40 (N. Ala. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 27, 703 (5th Cir., Mar. 14, 1969).
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whites; (2) Negroes could transfer into new departments and then back to their
original departments without any loss of either departmental or plant seniority;
and (3) the lines of progression in the various departments evidenced a
significant difference in skills and ability which was only achieved by
successfully performing a subordinate job within a particular department. The
court upheld the substantiality of the employer's interest and said:
The plant-wide transfer and bidding plan sought by the plaintiff
would similarly mean that an employee who has been working in
another department performing duties unrelated to the duties of the
vacant job would be entitled to claim the job. This might be a
perfectly proper result in a case where the circumstances otherwise
justified it and where the jobs in the departmental progression lines
are not dependent on the prior jobs in the line for training and
experience for the job to be filled.' 0 '
Section 703(h) states that a seniority system cannot be "bona fide" if it is
based on an intention to discriminate.' 5 However, the phrase "intention to
discriminate" may be interpreted as requiring a plaintiff to prove specific
discriminatory intent, i.e., a private law approach, or it may be construed to
allow the courts to infer a discriminatory intent from the natural and probable
consequences of an employer's actions, i.e., a public law approach. 06 One
proponent of the public law approach states:
The wording of the Act seems to support a public law interpretation.
Section 703(a)(2) and 703(c)(2), which prohibit uniawful
classifications, speak in terms of a functional test which looks to
the results and not in terms of a conceptual test which looks to
private culpability. The phrase "tend to deprive" or "otherwise
adversely affect" are phrases emphasizing consequences. Although
it is true that the remedial provision, section 706(g), refers to
"intent" the legislative history supports the conclusion that the
thrust of this "intent" was directed to a volitional, not an anti-racial
act. 107
The courts have generally supported the public law approach. The Fifth Circuit,
in the case of Papermakers Local 189 v. United States,' gave a great impetus
to the public law approach which had been initiated by the Quarles court. In
104. Id. at 67. See also Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga.
1969); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 295 F.Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
106. This approach is not new. The public law approach obtains under the National Labor
Relations Act.
107. Affeldt, Title VII In The Federal Courts-Privaieor Public Law, 115 VILL. LAW REV.

1,9(1969).
108.

416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Papermakers the defendant company, Crown Zellerbach, argued that it had
no intention to discriminate and sought to support this argument by
demonstrating that all of the company's progression lines had been opened to
Negroes. The company explained that all the Negroes were at the bottom of
these progression lines because of past discrimination and that this situation
was not evidence of a present intent to discriminate. In rejecting the defendant's
arguments the court said:
We find unpersuasive the argument that, whatever its operational
effects, job seniority is immune under the statute because not
imposed with the intent to discriminate. Section 703(h), ...
excludes from the strictures of Title VII different working terms
dictated by "bona fide" seniority systems "provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race. . .

."

Here, however, if Crown did not intend to punish

Negroes as such by reinstituting job seniority, the differences
between the job status of Negroes hired before 1966 and whites hired
at the same time would have to be called the "result" of Crown's
earlier, intentional discrimination.'
Thus, the courts in determining the validity of seniority systems compare the
relative worth of the employer's business purpose in maintaining the system
with the discriminatory effect produced on minority workers. Various factors,
such as past discrimination, the difference and degree of the skills required to
perform a particular job, safety factors and any procedures taken by the
employer to correct any racial imbalance that might exist among his employees
are all weighed carefully by the courts.
Employment Tests
The complexity of modern manufacturing processes has caused American
industry to utilize various testing methods to determine which of its employees
to hire and/or promote." 0 These tests fall into three general categories: (1) the
skill test; (2) the achievement test; and (3) the aptitude test. The legality of
the first two categories is not questioned. Both employers and minority groups
agree that a secretary must know how to type and bricklayer must know how
to lay bricks. The difficulty arises over the aptitude test, and it is tests of this
nature that will be: considered.
The purpose of the general aptitude test is to predict an employee's success
109. Id. at 995-96.
110. D. GOSLIN, THE SEARCH FOR ABILITY; STANDARDIZED TESTING IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE
98 (1963); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
ducation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968).
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or failure on the job by ascertaining his general level of intelligence. The relevant
statistics indicate that these tests tend to be culturally oriented and as such
present an opportunity for covert discrimination."' It is not surprising, therefore, that the legality of aptitude tests has generated considerable controversy.
At one extreme, minority groups contend that standard aptitude tests are an
illegal form of discrimination because minority groups, most of which suffer
from cultural deprivation, are placed at a competitive disadvantage. Conversely, the employers, while generally agreeing that minority groups do suffer
a competitive disadvantage, assert that they are entitled to hire and/or promote only those employees who are qualified. In the case of Myart v. Motorola.
Inc.,"' an Illinois hearing examiner adopted the rationale espoused by the
minority groups and invalidated an employer's aptitude test. Congress, however, was not sympathetic to the notion that an employer would be discriminating and thus violating the proposed Title VII, by administering an otherwise
fair aptitude test which some groups might find easier than others. The interpretative memorandum of Senators Clark and Case states:
There is no requirement in title VII that employers abandon bona
fide qualification tests where, because of differences in background
and education, members of some groups are able to perform better
on these tests than members of other groups. An employer may set
his qualifications as high as he.likes, he may test to determine which
applicants have these qualifications." 3
This interpretative statement notwithstanding, Senator Tower introduced an
amendment to Section 703(h) to vitiate the rationale of the Motorola decision.'4 This amendment was subsequently adopted and the testing provision of
Title VI I, as enacted, states:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon
the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin."'
The theory espoused by the minority groups, however, was not defunct and,
in fact, was partially revivified by the EEOC in its Employment Testing
Guidelines."' The guidelines established by the EEOC provide that an aptitude
I 1. M. MITCHELL, L. ALBRIGHT AND F. MCMURRAY, BIRACIAL VALIDATION OF SELECTION
PROCEDURES IN A LARGE SOUTHERN PLANT, Procedings of the 76th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Ass'n. (1968).
112. The opinion is reproduced in full at 110 CONG. REC. 9030-33 (1964).
113. Id. at 7213 (remarks of Senator Clark).
114. Id. at 13724 (remarks of Senator Tower).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
116. 35 Fed. Reg. 1233 (Aug. I, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
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test will be deemed to be discriminatory unless: "(a) the test has been validated
and evidences a high degree of utility . . . and (b) the person giving or acting
upon the results of the particular test can demonstrate that alternative suitable
hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are unavailable for his use.""' 7 The
guidelines further provide that any test-based differential in rates of rejection
that exists can only be justified by demonstrating the relevance of the test to
the position sought. The relevancy requirement is broadly interpreted if, in all
probability, the employees will be advanced within a reasonable period of time.
In this situation the employees are considered to be applying for the higher
8
level position."
The courts, in attempting to determine the validity of aptitude examinations,
have applied the Quarles rule, business necessity as compared with discriminatory effect. Considering the confused legislative history, the guidelines promulgated by the EEOC and the obvious merits of the various competing theories,
a conflict among the circuits was inevitable.
The legality of the EEOC's testing criterion that aptitude tests be job-related,
came under the judicial scrutiny of the Fourth Circuit in the case of Griggs
v. Duke Power Co." 9 In Griggs the employer was a corporation engaged in
the manufacture and transmission of electric power. The employer's operation
was divided into various subdivisions with the Dan River subdivision being the
subject of the controversy. The work force at Dan River was divided into five
main departments: (1)operations; (2) maintenance; (3) laboratory and testing;
(4) coal handling; and (5) labor. The labor department was the lowest paid
department and the one in which all of the defendant's Negro employees
worked. In 1955 the employer instituted a new hiring and advancement policy
which required all new employees to possess a high school education or its
equivalent. The employees in the labor department, however, were specifically
exempt from this requirement. Subsequently, the defendant amended this policy
by providing that an employee who was on the company payroll prior to 1965
could become eligible for transfer and promotion by successfully completing
an aptitude and mechanical ability test. At the time this case was decided only
four Negroes had become eligible to transfer under the employer's system.2 0
The plaintiffs asserted that these testing requirements were discriminatory and
invalid because there was no evidence of a valid business purpose and the tests
were not job related.
A majority of the Fourth Circuit decided that the employer's testing
117. Id. at § 1607.3.
118. Id. at § 1607.4(a).
119. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
120. Id. at 1229.
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requirements, as they applied to pre-1965 employees, were violative of Title
VII. The court emphasized that many white employees possessed high school
educations and were hired into departments other than labor. They were not,
therefore, subject to the defendant's testing requirements. The court concluded
that by requiring the Negro employees who were hired prior to 1965 to pass
the aptitude and mechanical ability tests the employer had successfully locked
these employees into the labor department. The testing requirements were,
therefore, invalidated with respect to the Negro employees hired prior to 1965.
In deciding that the testing requirements of the defendant were valid as
applied to Negroes hired after 1965, Judge Boreman, writing for the majority,
concluded that employment tests did not have to be job related. The majority,
however, limited its holding by stating:
This decision is not to be construed as holding that any educational
or testing requirement adopted by any employer is valid under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.121
In holding that an aptitude test need not be job related, the majority applied
the criteria provided in Title VII, i.e., is the test intended to discriminate and
is it bona fide. The court held that the test was not intended to be used as a
subtle tool for discrimination and based this conclusion on the fact that the
testing policy was instituted nine years prior to the passage of the Act. The
court also noted that the company had ceased its discriminatory practices and
thus concluded that the tests were instituted and administered in good faith.
The court decided that the testing requirements were bona fide because they
satisfied the Quarles rule. The court broadly construed the business purpose
criterion of that rule and stated:
The company had an obvious business motive and objective in
establishing the high school requirement, [and testing requirement]
that is, hiring only personnel who had a reasonable expectation of
ascending the promotional ladders into supervisory positions
thereby eliminating road blocks which would interfere with movement to higher classifications and tend to decrease efficiency and
morale throughout the entire work force.'
The Griggs majority also concluded that the legislative history did not
support the EEOC's direct job relation theory and stated:
At no place in the Act or in its legislative history does there appear
a requirement that an employer may utilize only those tests which
measure the ability and skill required by a specific job or group of
jobs. In fact the legislative history would seem to indicate clearly
121.
122.

Id. at 1235 n.8 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1233 n.2.
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that Congress was actually trying to guard against such
An amendment requiring a "direct relation" between the
a "particular position" was proposed in May 1968,
defeated. We agree with the district court that a test does
to be job related in order to be valid under § 703(h).111

a result.
test and
but was'
not have

In applying the Quarles rule the Griggs majority did not consider the effect
of the testing provisions on minority groups. The majority mistakenly agreed
with the plaintiffs and held that if the testing requirements fulfilled a valid
business purpose, the effect produced was irrelevant. Judge Sobeloff, who
concurred in part and dissented in part, was more perceptive. After eschewing
the validity of the employer's business purpose, he stated:
On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that while this practice
does not constitute forthright racial discrimination, the policy
disfavoring the outside employees has primary impact on blacks.,"
Judge Sobeloff, in correctly applying the Quarles rule, accorded due deference
to the effect produced by the defendant's testing requirements, and would have
invalidated them.175
The Griggs decision notwithstanding, the EEOC continued to insist that
employers comply with the criteria established in its guidelines, i.e., that tests
be job related. This continued insistence resulted in further judicial
consideration of this criterion, and in Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,' 2' the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana upheld the EEOC's
position. Only two of the six issues presented to the Hicks court concerned
the defendant's testing procedures and, accordingly, only these will be
7
considered '
Commencing in 1963, all applicants for employment in the production and
maintenance departments at Crown's Bogalusa facilities were required to
successfully complete a battery of standardized tests. In 1964 this requirement
was extended to employees seeking to transfer into more desirable departments
which had previously been segregated and reserved for whites. In 1965, J. Hicks,
in an attempt to transfer into another department, took and failed the required
tests. Shortly thereafter, he filed an unlawful employment practice charge with
the EEOC. The EEOC, after failing to secure Crown's compliance with its
guidelines, notified Hicks of his right to bring a civil suit. Hicks filed a class
123. Id. at 1235.
124. Id. at 1247.
125. Previous cases had also reached the result espoused by Judge Sobeloff. See Dobbins v.
Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
126. 319 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. La. 1970).
127

Id at 316
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action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. The plaintiffs in
Hicks asserted two grounds in challenging the validity of Crown's testing
proceeures: (I) the effect of the requirement was to exclude a disproportionate
number of Negroes; and (2) the tests did not adequately or successfully predict
job performance.2 8 The court, in attempting to determine the validity of the
testing requirements, directed its attention to the defendant's intention in
administering the test and to the test's "bona fide" qualifications. The court
concluded, and the plaintiffs agreed, that the defendant had not adopted the
tests to covertly discriminate. In deciding whether the testing procedures were
bona fide the court utilized the business necessity rule of Quarles.
The Hicks court, in applying the Quarles rule, narrowly construed the term
business necessity and concluded that the only valid business purpose that a
test could serve was to accurately predict an employee's ability to perform in
a particularly position. In narrowly defining the term "business necessity" the
court was inevitably led to conclude that the EEOC's "job related" criterion
was valid. The court justified its restrictive interpretation by stating:
The choice of appropriate tests for an employer is a difficult
procedure requiring careful study and evaluation. Without such
study, even experienced professional psychologists concede that they
can do no more than make guesses which are often completely
wrong. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding test use is aggravated
when tests are given to a mixed racial group which has been educated
in segregated schools because tests assume that persons have had
relatively equal exposure to educational materials. This makes
careful professional study even more essential in such a situation.
Without such study no employer can have any confidence in the
reasonableness or validity of his tests; and he therefore cannot in
good faith assert that business necessity requires that these tests of
29
unknown value be used.
The Hicks court also noted that its restrictive interpretation was in accordance
with, and indeed commanded by, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Local 189,
Papermakers v. United. States.11 Thus, the Quarles rule, as construed and
applied by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, resulted in different conclusions.
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Griggs to resolve the
conflict inherent in applying the Quarles rule. In deciding Griggs,' the
Supreme Court had two possible choices: (1)broadly interpret "business
. 128.

The passing rates on the tests given were as follows: test 1-37.3 percent for whites, 9.8

percent for blacks; test 2-64.9 percent for whites, 15.4 percent for blacks.
129.
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319 F. Supp. at 319.
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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necessity" but nevertheless reverse Griggs because of the overwhelming
discriminatory effect produced; or (2) narrowly interpret "business necessity"
and apply the Hicks rationale. The court chose the latter alternative.
The question presented to the Court in Griggs was one of first impression.
After briefly reciting the factual background, Chief Justice Burger, in writing
for a unanimous Court, observed that the tests utilized by the defendant "were
not directed or intended to measure the ability to learn to perform a particular
job or category of jobs." The Chief Justice also stated that the objective of
Congress in enacting Title VII was "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees."' 3 2 These factors
when considered with the inferior education received by Negroes in segregated
schools led the Court to invalidate the testing procedures utilized by the Duke
Power Company. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Section
703(h) specifically allowed an employer to use any professionally developed test
as long as it was not used with an intention to discriminate. The Chief Justice
said that the company's lack of discriminatory intent was not controlling
because Congress had aimed "the thrust of the Act to the consequences" of
a hiring and/or promotion practice. Thus, the Court officially adopted the
public law approach in construing the phrase "intention to discriminate." The
Court also expressed its disfavor with broad testing devices and said:
The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and
general testing devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas
or degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with
examples of men and women who rendered highly effective
performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in
terms of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. '
The Court, however., specifically left undecided the issue of the validity of a
testing requirement that takes into consideration the capability necessary for
successfully performing in a superior position. 34 The validity of employment
tests according to the Chief Justice is determined by business necessity. "If
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."'3 The Griggs
decision, as thus summarized, is an in toto adoption of the Hicks rationale.

132.
133.
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135.
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Guidelines for the Employer
The purpose of Congress in enacting Title VII was to eliminate discrimination
in employment from the private sector of our economy. The federal courts and
the EEOC have taken this congressional command and successfully challenged
many long established business practices. Many employers have been unpleasantly surprised to discover that one or more of their business practices violated
Title VII. Unless an employer carefully analyzes all the elements of his labor
relations policies, he may discover that he has "broken the law without really
trying."
The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, while only expressly deciding the
legality of employment aptitude tests, provides an excellent framework for
analyzing the legality of other business practices. The criteria provided in Title
VII, and applied by the Court in Griggs, for determining the validity of
employment practices are (I) that the practice, i.e., the employment test,
seniority system, or preference for a particular sex or religion, be bona fide,
and (2) that the practice not be the result of an "intention to discriminate."
The Griggs decision clearly adopts the "public law" interpretation of the phrase
"intention to discriminate." Simply stated, this means that an employer will
be held responsible for any discrimination that results from the natural and
probable consequences of his actions. The Griggs decision also demonstrates
that the Court will narrowly interpret and apply the "business necessity" test.
Any employment practice, which is arguably an unlawful employment practice,
will only be sustained if it is directly related to the "safe and efficient" operation of the employer's business. The application and interpretation that this
test receives, however, is determined by the business practice under consideration.
The legality of seniority systems under this "safe and efficient" criterion' 36
depends on the following factors: (i) a significant difference in the degree of
skills and abilities needed to perform a particular job; (2) achievement of these
skills and abilities depends on the successful completion of a subordinate job;
(3) upward mobility for minority workers is possible; and (4) if the system is
departmental, that minority workers are not penalized for transfering into other
departments and then back to their original department. These criteria
emphasize the "safe" aspect of the "business necessity" test. If the employer
wishes to rely on the "efficient" part of that test his evidence will have to meet
37
a much heavier burden.1
136. In Griggs the Supreme Court uses the phrase "job performance." This phrase is synonymous with restrictively defining and applying the "business necessity" test.
137. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Lator Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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The validity of employment tests will be sustained only if the test is designed
to accurately determine the employee's ability to perform the job in question
in a "safe and efficient" manner. Considering the inability of the drafters of
aptitude tests to agree on the significance of the test results, it is unlikely that
any court will sustain them.
The preference that many employers have for hiring male over female
employees or vice-versa must meet the same "safe and efficient" requirement.
38
The Supreme Court in the case of Phillips v. Martin MariettaCorp., in which
the plaintiff was refused employment because she had pre-school age children,
said that Title VII did not permit "one hiring policy for women and another
for men-each having pre-school age children."'2 The Court indicated that
such a hiring practice would only be valid if it was "demonstrably ... relevant
to job performance."' This statement by the Court indicates its acceptance
of the "safe and efficient" requirement in sex discrimination cases as applied
by the Fifth Circuit in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co."' In Weeks the
court held "that in order to' rely on the bona fide occupation qualification
exception an employer has the burden of proving that . . all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved."" ' The same circuit, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., explained how it would apply the "business necessity" test to sex
discrimination cases.4 3 The court, in holding that the female sex was not a
bona fide occupational qualification for the job of flight cabin attendant, stated
that discrimination based on sex is valid only where the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.
This holding places more weight on the safety aspect of the "business necessity"
test. The significance of this decision, however, lies not in its application of
the "business necessity" test, but in its announcement that an employer may
not exclude all members of one sex because most members of that sex cannot
adequately perform the job. If this rationale receives the approval of the
Supreme Court a business practice which specifies a sex can never be bona
fide. An employer could demonstrate to a court that 95 percent of the particular
sex excluded from consideration could not safely or efficiently perform the job
in question. However, because the remaining five percent might perform
adequately the practice will be struck down. This can only result in a very costly
and time-consuming process for the employer because all members of the
excluded sex must be given a chance to fail. Considering the Diaz court's
138. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
139. Id. at 544.
140. Id.
141. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
142. Id. at 235. Emphasis added.
143. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 3 FEP Cas. 337 (5th Cir. 1971).
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rationale and its application of the "business necessity" test, an employer will
find it almost impossible to have his preferences for male or female employees
in specific jobs sustained.
An employer's preference should be upheld where he can demonstrate a
markedly higher absentee rate or lower production rate for members of the
excluded sex. This information stresses the efficiency factor of the "business
necessity" test and should be very carefully considered by the courts. Judges
must remember that the "business necessity" test that has been stated and
applied by the courts consists of two factors, safety and efficiency. The courts
should weigh these factors equally, and not consider, as they now do, the safety
factor as determinative.
The applicability of the "business necessity" test to an employer's preference
for employees of a particular religious persuasion is largely undetermined. The
cases involving religious discrimination have dealt with the treatment accorded
to those already employees. These cases have held that an employer does not
violate Title VII for discharging employees who fail to abide by their
contractual obligations under a collective bargaining agreement for religious
reasons. 4 The "business necessity" test is capable of being applied to religious
discrimination cases. The determinative factor would probably be efficiency
because safety, in all likelihood, would be irrelevant. The central problem in
this area will be the judiciary's allocation of the weight to be accorded to the
efficiency aspect-must it go the essence of the employer's business, as the Diaz
court held, or will the employer's evidence of lost profits be sufficient, as it
should be.
Employers and unions that are subject to the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Act have a duty to bargain collectively on matters concerning
wages, hours, and conditions of employment.' The National Labor Relations
Board has held, however, that an employer need not bargain with a union over
the inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement of a clause that is violative
of the law. 4 ' This principle should apply to the proscriptions of Title VII. An
employer should be allowed to refuse to bargain with a union if the union insists
on imposing an illegal business practice on him. The employer, however, must
be very careful in correctly ascertaining the application of the discriminatory
practice, for if it is solely a matter of internal union administration his refusal
to bargain would be illegal.' 47
144.
145.
146.
147.
(6th Cir.
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The validity of any employment practice, therefore, can readily be ascertained by answering the following two questions: (I) does the business practice
serve to promote the "safe and efficient" operation of the employer's business;
and (2) does the practice produce discrimination. If utilization of the business
practice does not produce discrimination, it will be validated. However, as the
level of discrimination produced increases, the necessity of the employment
practice must also rise-in a geometric proportion.
The Tenth Circuit case of Jones v. Lee Way Motor Frieght, Inc.'48 provides
an excellent example of how the courts will answer the two required questions
and the relative weight that the answers will be accorded. The issue involved
in Jones was the validity of the employer's job classification system. The
company classified its employees as either "over the road" or "city" drivers
and refused to allow them to transfer from one category to another. The
company employed no blacks in the better paying position of "over the road"
driver, while most of the whites, 80 percent, were in this category. All of the
company's black employees were "city" drivers. The plaintiffs alleged that the
company'i no-transfer policy, when considered in its factual context, was
discriminatory because it effectively "locked" them into inferior positions and
was not predicated on a valid business purpose. Conversely, the company
argued that its policy did serve valid business purposes and enumerated them
as follows: (1) bad experience with transfers in the past; (2) the prohibitive cost
of training both the transferee and his replacement; and (3) grievances and other
related problems which might arise from job categories that were covered by
separate union contracts. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the company that the
reasons advanced for its policies were substantial, but nevertheless, decided that
they fell short of the required "business necessity." Clearly, the basis for the
court's decision in Jones was the discriminatory effect produced by the
company's policy. The efficiency factor of the "business necessity" test was
obviously disregarded. Thus, it is apparent, that of the two necessary criteria
used to determine the validity of an employment practice, i.e., business necessity
and discriminatory effect, the more significant, and therefore, the more
determinative is discriminatory effect. It is also clear that the safety factor of
the "business necessity" test is considered more seriously than are the claims
49
by employers of deceased efficiency.
The implication of the foregoing is that the business practices of employers
that are based on pre-Act discrimination will be judged by the "business
necessity" test of Hicks. The question then arises as to the validity of business
148. 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3388 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1971).
149. The Supreme Court denied certerori in Jones on the same day that it decided Griggs.
While no inference may be legally derived from this denial, the Court's adoption of the Hicks'
rationale in Griggs would seem to indicate that Jones would have been upheld.
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practices that are not founded on prior discriminatory actions but, nevertheless
produce a type of de facto discrimination. Are they to be judged by the same
criteria? This question must be answered in the affirmative. The Griggs Court
said that Congress aimed "the thrust of the Act to the consequences" of the
business practice. 54 There is no difference between business practices that are
based. on prior discriminatory actions and those that are not, for the effect
produced is the same. The "public law" approach adopted by the Supreme
Court indicates that prior discrimination is irrelevant and the only probative
factors are "business necessity" and discriminatory effect. This.in toto application of the Hicks test will necessarily lead to the invalidation of all business
practices that fail to satisfy the Hicks criteria.
Conclusion
Congress vested the real power to enforce the substantive provisions of Title
VII to the federal courts and they have not hesitated to use it. The courts,
armed with Title VII, have entered the area of employer discretion and
drastically revised business operations. In most cases the results obtained have
been laudable. However, the courts do not possess any great degree of business
expertise and therefore, the employer's domain should be invaded only when
necessary and then with extreme caution. In applying the "business necessity"
test of Hicks the courts should give more weight to the reasons and purposes
espoused by the employer. The employer's years of experience in predicting
the consequences and effects that a particular system or practice will have on
his business should not be dismissed lightly. The courts must remember that
all of society, and not simply the employer, must bear the burden of raising
the economic standards of minority groups.
Arthur M. Brewer
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